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INTRODUCTION
The customary practice of meeting urban water deficit through supply augmentation by tapping new, distant, and multiple-use water sources often disturbs sectoral allocation and causes inter-sectoral water conflicts. The common prescription for resolving such conflicts involves market-based approach to inter-sectoral water transfers. Although the market approach is theoretically sound and also preferable as a long-term solution, the potential for the violation of several assumptions implicit in this approach minimizes its practicability as an immediate and universal solution. With an uneconomic rate structure and pervasive use inefficiency and wastage within the urban water sector, inter-sectoral water transfers--even when they are market-based--are likely to conceal use inefficiency, damage the incentive structure, and dampen the urge to explore both the system and user level supply augmentation options evident even within the existing supply limits. The main aim of this paper is to empirically demonstrate this point and, in the process, identify the economic and institutional conditions necessary to ensure the viability of inter-sectoral water transfers--whether market-based or otherwise--as a solution to urban water scarcity.
Utilizing both primary and secondary information pertaining to the water sector of Hyderabad city, India, this paper (a) evaluates the economics of various technically * The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank. feasible supply augmentations options, (b) estimates the group-specific water demand and consumption response functions under alternative pricing (average and marginal) behaviors, (c) calculates the net willingness to pay (NWTP)--considered to be the vaue of raw water at source--of different user groups from their respective price elasticities, (d) demonstrates how inadequate is the NWTP to justify most supply augmentation options including inter-sectoral water transfers under the existing water rate structure, (e) argues that the economic and institutional conditions internal to urban water sector can never support an externally imposed water transfers--whether market-based or otherwise--as long as the water rate structure is uneconomical and regressive, and (f) concludes by underlining the central role that the pricing option--both the level and structure--plays not only in activating a number of non-price options but also in generating incentives for the emergence of new and the consolidation of existing institutional mechanisms needed to support economically rooted water transfers and conservation initiatives.
THE EMPIRICAL SETTING
The water sector of Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh, India presents not only problems typical of many other cities but also solutions common to most urban centers both in India and elsewhere. With a geographic coverage of 1547 square kilometer and a population of about 4.35 million growing at an annual rate of 2.17 percent, the gross annual water demand for the city is projected to triple from 362 million cubic meter (mcm) in 1991 to 1013 mcm by 2021. Against this growing demand, the net water supply (i.e., excluding leakages and losses) from the six supply sources developed till 1994 is only 206 mcm giving rise to a 40 percent deficit in net demand [Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB), 1995a:5] . Notably, the water losses in the treatment and distribution stages amounting to 50 percent of net demand deficit at present is expected to account for 82 and 67 percent of the same by 2001 and 2011 respectively. If the total water loss at the system as a whole is reckoned, it will certainly be close to, if not exceed, both the observed and projected demand deficits. This indicates the vast scope for deficit reduction present even within the existing supply limits by minimizing water wastage and improving use efficiency.
The pattern of water source development in Hyderabad during 1922-1994 reveals three important aspects (see Saleth and Dinar, 1997:10-11) . First, the time gap between successive projects especially after 1927 declines steeply suggesting the urgency of supply augmentation to keep pace with the growing urban demand. Second, since the distance of the water source from the city is increasing with each new project, not only the cost but also distribution and transmission losses have become increasingly higher.
Third, unlike the earlier sources that involve essentially water diversion from tanks (i.e., large ponds) located within the city limits, the recent as well as the proposed projects rely on direct diversion from rivers through barrages and dams located far away from the city. As such, apart from the cost and water loss implications, the increasing reliance on distant and multiple-use water sources enhances the scope for inter-sectoral water conflicts. The intensity of these inter-sectoral conflicts will be more severe when a series of long-distance inter-basin water transfers from Krishna and Godavari rivers are undertaken after 2001. And, finally, the supply system depends almost exclusively on surface sources as groundwater sources within the city--developed essentially by private parties--can meet no more than just 6 percent of the total future water demand (HMWSSB, 1995b:5) .
Although cost and water quality considerations do not favour groundwater as an exclusive source for all uses, its role as a supplementary and stand-by source cannot, however, be ignored completely especially when metro supply becomes inadequate or unreliable.
The most serious problem with the existing water supply system is its deteriorating physical health of the storage, treatment, and distribution networks. For example, in the case of Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar accounting together for 60 percent of the total storage and 28 percent of total nominal yield of all the existing water sources, siltation has reduced the gross storage capacity by 12 and 20 percent respectively causing their combined water yield to be only 68 percent of their potential yield (HMWSSB, 1995b:5&75) . Since most part of the water supply system is service since the 1920s, even to maintain its present water service level, the system requires a massive rehabilitation and strengthening program costing Rs. 7.3 billion (Rs. 39.10 = US $1 in 1998). While the need to tap additional sources is inevitable given the fast growing demand, the massiveness of supply addition planned under these schemes could not only cause a heavy strain on the already inefficient transmission and distribution networks but also damage the already fragile incentive environment.
The economic environment of the city's water supply system can be captured in terms of the cost and revenue of the water supply agency on the one hand and the prevailing level and structure of water tariff on the other hand. The cost recovery that has remained at 100 percent or above till 1993-94 has declined to 88 percent by 1994-95. In the face of a six-fold increase in the average supply cost of metro water [i.e., from Rs. 0.88 to 5.58/cubic meter (cum)] during 1989-95, the average water charge continues to remain at about Rs.
3.62/cum since 1993 (HMWSSB, 1995a) . The long-run average and marginal cost curves constructed for the city's water supply system reveal that the average cost declines with supply whereas the marginal cost, though declines with supply up to 315 cum, rises at an increasing rate beyond that supply level (see Saleth and Dinar, 1997:15) . Since both costs are higher than their revenue counterparts, the water supply system cannot escape a severe financial unless the water rate structure is revised to fully reflect the economic realities. Table 1 shows the residential water rate structure for the city. Although the slabspecific water rates are increasing at an increasing rate, the rate structure is biased in favor of larger consumers due to the consumption slab structure where the gap between subsequent slabs increases at a much faster rate. The rate structure is also inequitable as some of the users with a consumption of less than 15 cum and paying a fixed fee will be paying more per unit than some others. For instance, a consumer with a monthly consumption of 10 cum will pay Rs. 4.00 whereas another using 50 cum will pay only Rs. 3.90. Although the average water rate, though rise with consumption beyond 15 cum, it increases only at a declining rate making the cost of additional consumption to fall. With lower water rates and declining marginal cost of water to users, the urge to conserve water becomes as weak as the revenue yielding capacity. While the average cost of water provision has increased from Rs. 0.88 to Rs. 5.58/cum during 1989-95, the rate structure yields an average water charge of only Rs. 3.62. Since it is this uneconomic rate structure including the price perception that it generates among users that determines the economic environment for water use decisions at the user-end, it provides very little incentive for exploring micro level supply augmentation options including household level water use efficiency and conservation.
S UPPLY AUGMENTATION: ECONOMICS OF ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
Supply augmentation efforts--both at the system and at the user level--are necessary to minimize the effects of water deficit. At the system level, besides the options centered on system strengthening and rehabilitation as well as water transfers from Krishna and Godavari schemes, the water deficit is also managed by interim policies involving a combination of supply hour manipulation and differential inter-city water allocation.
Although the average supply hours for the city as a whole is 3 hours/day (expected to be 6-7 hours/day after 2001 with Krishna water transfers), it is not uniform across uses and regions within the city limits. Among uses, the industrial and commercial water demand is fully met whereas the residential demand is met only partially. Across regions, while net allocation covers 64 percent of net demand in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) area, it covers only 28 percent of the same in the non-MCH area within the city. Besides, the actual supply hours is not uniform throughout the city as areas of economic and political importance could manage to get water for more hours than areas with less organized or dispersed pressure groups.
At the micro level, users--both domestic and non-domestic--also adjust with water deficit at their end by relying on a variety of supply augmentation options depending upon their water needs and economic capacity. These options range from investment in in-house storage to the installation of own wells. Other options which are either partially adopted or potentially adoptable are: water purchase from private tankers, privately organized small scale water transfer from irrigation, joint supply arrangements by neighborhood groups, and inter-household water sharing including local water markets. The issue of how to encourage the widespread adoption of these micro level options which are currently confined to a small segment of consumers and the active exploration others which are technically feasible has strategic significance in managing the overall system level water scarcity. Since most micro level options are also private in nature, supply augmentation occurs at the user-end, that too, with an in-built individual incentive for water use efficiency and conservation. The issues plus political economy considerations should remain as caveats for the analysis of the relative cost advantages of the identified set of supply augmentation options.
The unit cost estimates for the identified set of 11 options range from Rs. 0.55 to 62.50/cum defining not only the feasible economic range for various forms of micro and macro level supply augmentation initiatives but also for fixing urban water rates at economic levels. Since the economic feasibility of these options depends critically on the prevailing water rate structure and the price perception that it generates, both the level and structure of urban water rates play a central role in activating the whole spectrum of supply augmentation options available both at the system and at the user levels. Economic pricing of water is, therefore, necessary not only for improving the financial viability and water use efficiency of the supply system but also for providing incentive for private initiatives especially in the form of inter-household and inter-sectoral water exchanges and joint ownership and management of ground water wells and other water supply sources by user groups. Since pricing reform has an instrumental role in promoting less costly local level supply augmentation options, it can help either to delay or to reduce the size of investment-wise costly water transfers from Krishna and Godavari rivers as well as generate funds for financing future supply augmentation projects.
PRICING STRUCTURE, WATER DEMAND, AND SUPPLY AUGMENTATION
Unfortunately, the existing structure of water supply tariff in Hyderabad seems to be less suited for playing the strategic roles expected under the pricing option. To demonstrate the undesirable incentive effects of the existing rate structure and to delineate the character of a more efficient rate structure, one can utilise the empirically estimated water demand functions distinguished by users' pricing behavior and disaggregated by their consumption level and economic status. For providing context and justification for the estimation exercise and its methodological basis, it is useful, at this stage, to have an issuebased analytical review of the existing literature on urban water demand and pricing behavior.
Existing Literature: An Analytical Review
While Gibbons (1986) , Herrington (1987) , and Young (1996) provide a much more comprehensive review of existing urban water demand studies, the review attempted here focuses mainly on the main analytical and methodological issues. The review yields five points of immediate relevance for the purpose of this paper.
First, since most studies estimate residential water demand functions for mature urban centers in advanced countries rather than for evolving urban supply systems in developing countries, the estimation exercise they yielded well behaved demand functions with a negative coefficient for the price variable irrespective of the estimation context and data.
3 Second, although the preferred approach requires the estimation of water demand at the micro context using household level data (Schefter and David, 1985; Young, 1996) , the common approach involves the macro context of regions, communities, or time points.
4 Third, while there are studies that disaggregate demand functions by regions or communities (e.g., Howe and Linaweaver, 1967; Wong, 1972; Foster and Beattie, 1979) , by seasons (e.g., Howe and Linaweaver, 1967; Young, 1973; Danielson, 1979; Griffin and Chang, 1991) , and by peak and off-peak conditions (e.g., Lyman, 1992) , with very few exceptions (e.g., William and Suh, 1986; Schneider and Whitlach, 1991) , there is hardly any study that disaggregate water demand functions by well defined user groups.
Fourth, since urban water is priced mostly under a block rate system--either in its increasing or decreasing forms--with a flat fee for the lowest consumption slab, the specification of appropriate price variable is critical. Earlier studies used either average price (e.g., Wong, 1972; and Foster Beattie, 1980) or marginal price (e.g., Howe and Linaweaver, 1967) as the only price variable in the demand function. While some researchers (e.g., Gibbs, 1978; have argued the marginal price to represent consumer behavior better, others (e.g., Foster and Beattie, 1981; Shin, 1985) have empirically demonstrated that average price reflects well the users' price perception under block rate system. However, there are also studies which use the marginal price along with a 'difference variable' capturing the difference between the actual water bill and the bill that would have resulted if all units were priced at the marginal price (e.g., Billings and Agthe, 1980; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989) .
5
And, finally, although most studies are based on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique, there are also studies which rely on advanced estimation procedures based on instrumental variables (IV) (e.g., Deller, et al., 1986; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989 ), 2-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS) (e.g., Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989; McKean, et al., Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) , Schneider and Whitlach (1991) , and Hewitt and Hanemann (1996) . Even among them, while Billings and Agthe (1980) and Agthe and Billing (1987) use only the average figures, Deller, et al. (1986) and Chicoine, et al. (1986) , though use household data, deal with rural rather than urban context. 5 Although Foster and Beattie (1981) found their demand estimate under the average price is almost identical to that under the marginal price formulation including the difference variable, we will argue below and demonstrate later with our demand estimates that the latter price formulation has important methodological advantages.
1996), and 3-SLS (e.g., Agthe, et al., 1986; Chicoine, et al., 1986) to correct the simultaneity bias considered to be inherent in OLS estimates under block rate system. Some of the points noted above have already taken the discussion towards two of the most serious controversies persisting in the literature on water demand in particular and block rate pricing in general. While the fourth point is related to the economic and behavioral issue of whether it is the average or the marginal price that accurately reflects users' price perception, the last point is concerned with the econometric issue of simultaneity bias. Interestingly, these issues are inter-linked as both of them have their origin in the block rate system with a fixed fee component where price becomes endogenous varying with consumption causing the simultaneity problem, which gets, of course, magnified when the average price that makes price as an explicit function of quantity is specified as the only price variable in the demand function.
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To avoid the simultaneity problem inherent in block pricing, Taylor (1975) has suggested the use of both the average and marginal prices as they could capture more accurately the effects of both the intra-marginal rates and fixed fee on demand. Later, Nordin (1976) has modified Taylor's proposition with the use of marginal price along with the difference variable that captures the price-induced income effects on demand. 8 Notice that with a given quantity or budget share of water bill, the difference variable captures the full extent that a user can adjust quantity to price and vice versa. In this sense, the marginal price formulation with the difference variable solves the econometric problem of simultaneity by incorporating an economic variable to capture the price-quantity adjustment potential. But, this solution becomes less relevant when either the budget share of water bill changes substantially or the difference variable is itself subject to simultaneity, or there is scope for substituting metro water with water from other sources. In either of these 6 The price specification controversy has another related dimension as argue that when consumers face a rate schedule, the whole price schedule rather than any single price--whether the average or marginal price--has to be used in demand estimation. In fact, Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) use such a price formulation in their IV and 2-SLS-based empirical exercise. 7 This can also happen even when the marginal price alone is used (see Billings and Agthe, 1980) . situations, one requires more direct econometric approach to explicitly tackle the simultaneity problem.
In reality, however, neither the economic basis for simultaneity nor its effects on consumption seem to be strong enough to require an explicit econometric correction. For instance, Foster and Beattie (1981:627) argue that the basic condition for simultaneity, i.e., users' perfect knowledge of the rate structure, is mostly unmet in practice. Even when this condition holds, the incentive for using such knowledge in actual consumption decisions will be the least as long as water bill forms only a tiny fraction of total household budget. 9 The extent of price-induced adjustments in urban water demand depends not only on the magnitude of the price-induced income effects but also on the substitution effects capturing the extent users can rely on non-metro water sources. With lower water rates and little difference between rates for subsequent consumption slabs, the magnitude of these income and substitution effects are likely to be lower than that needed to create the simultaneity problem. There is, therefore, little economic basis for the econometric issue of simultaneity.
Although there are studies (e.g., Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989) providing evidence for the simultaneity problem, there are also others giving evidence to the contrary. 10 It seems that the empirical validity of the simultaneity problem is more contextual as it depends on the estimation context and data set. Simultaneity is likely to be a serious problem in the context of both aggregate data where there is scope for spatial/temporal variations in the rate structure as well as micro data when the sample is dominated by users in the lowest consumption slab with a fixed fee. Obviously, studies using data with these characteristics (e.g., Billings and Agthe, 1980; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989 ) may require an explicit econometric correction for simultaneity through the use of IV, 2-SLS, or 3-SLS technique. In other contexts, where the data allows the estimation of disaggregated demand functions for different user groups defined preferably by consumption brackets and water demand potential, the difference variable is adequate to handle simultaneity and OLS procedure is enough to yield reliable estimates.
Turning to the average vs. marginal price debate, the approach involving marginal price with the difference variable, though used to rationalize marginal price-taking behavior is, in fact, captures implicitly the effects of price switch (i.e., from average to marginal price) on consumption. When the difference variable is negative and significant, it means that users are perceiving a price other than the marginal price which, given the block rate system and the information problems noted by Foster and Beattie (1981) and Shin (1985) , could essentially be the average price. 11 That is, the marginal price with the difference variable approach accepts the average price behavior but investigates the consumption behavior when users perceive the marginal price instead of the average price. Since the marginal pricing approach does not contradict but presupposes the average pricing behavior, the price perception debate is not so much a controversy on price specification per se as that on the relative relevance of the positive vs. normative approach to consumer behavior under block rate pricing. In any case, the price perception debate has the following implications for the methodology of this paper.
First, since price perception debate has unduly focused on the price level, it has sidelined the much more important issue related to the price structure. Although a switch from average to marginal price can alter consumption, its effects can get diluted when the price structure is regressive with very low incremental slab rates. Thus, the price switch though necessary, is not sufficient without a substantial change in the rate structure.
Second, given the positivist nature of average pricing behavior and the normative nature of marginal pricing behavior, the estimation and comparison of demand functions under both prices is useful to demonstrate the effects of price level caused by the price switch.
11 Under an increasing block rate system, the price coefficient can also be positive especially when micro level panel data is used. This does not necessarily mean that the function being estimated is the supply instead of the demand function as argued incorrectly by .
And, finally, the consumption response function (that relates price switch-induced price and consumption changes) provides a methodological basis for designing efficient price structure. Since the price switch captures the effects of pricing level (i.e., the gap between average and marginal prices) on consumption, the response function helps both in evaluating feasible group-specific price hikes as well as in identifying economically relevant supply augmentation options both within the existing and alternative water rate structure.
Methodology
The purpose of this paper requires a methodology that admits the analytical relevance of both prices, permits the endogenization of the simultaneity issue within the estimated demand model itself, and allows the simultaneous evaluation of the roles of both price perception and price structure. It is useful, at the outset, to clarify some of the less obvious variables defined above.
For residential water consumption, there are four price tiers (see Table 1 , and N and H are as defined above. Since D a is zero as the actual water bill of the consumers is identical to the one that will result from that under P a , the demand function under the average pricing behavior becomes:
But, since D m is not zero, the demand function under the marginal pricing behavior will be:
The demand functions [2] and [3] imply that there are differences both in the behavioral postulate and in the information level assumed to be available to users. Under average pricing behavior, users' knowledge on the rate structure is either absent or of less value for making consumption decisions (Foster and Beattie, 1981; Shin, 1985) . As argued already, although there is some mathematical basis for simultaneity, its practical effects on consumption will be inconsequential. 
Equation [4] can provide more realistic information on consumption behavior when the actual consumption is below the full requirement and the tiny budget share of water bill allows increased expenditure on additional water consumption. 12 The response function can also provide key information for determining the level of water rate hike needed to realize either a given reduction in consumption or a given increment in revenue. However, the response function is not a substitute for demand function as it is the price elasticity derived from the latter that provides the means for estimating consumers' willingness to pay (WTP).
Given the WTP, the willingness to accept the price hike (or, adjust their metro water consumption) can be evaluated from consumers' surplus or NWTP derived by subtracting water rate from the WTP.
With the demand function and its price elasticity, the NWTP can be obtained by using the procedure suggested by Young, et al. (1972) . This procedure, that requires the price elasticity to be constant but non-unitary within a relevant range, involves three steps.
First, the area under the demand curve for a given quantity change is calculated as follows:
where x = (1/|e|), e = price elasticity, P = initial price, Q 1 = initial quantity, and Q 2 = changed quantity. Then, V obtained from equation [5] is divided by (Q 1 -Q 2 ) and the water price P is subtracted from the resultant value. The end product is the consumer's surplus for the marginal increment in quantity that approximates users' NWTP. It is clear from [5] that the value of NWTP is affected by the absolute value of price elasticity, the extent of quantity change, and the level of initial price. While price elasticity has an inverse effect on NWTP, the quantity change has a direct effect on the same. The relationship between the initial price and NWTP is such that when the former is doubled, the value of the latter will also get doubled (see Young, 1996:76) .
The NWTP has important roles in our context. First, as noted already, it helps in establishing the value that consumers place on raw water under the existing water rate structure. As such, it also helps in approximating the transmission, treatment, and distribution costs that separate raw water at source from tap water at the user-end. Second, it also helps in identifying the supply augmentation options listed in Table 2 which are within the economic reach of users at current rate structure. And, finally, since it determines the feasible range for price hike, it can also help in designing an efficient water rate structure that can activate supply augmentation options which are outside the economic realm under the existing rate structure.
Since the water rate structure has a differential impact on different groups of users, it is necessary to estimate the equations houses, and houses in slum areas). A disaggregated estimation exercise performed in these estimation contexts is useful to understand both the overall and group-specific price responsiveness as well as the economic potential for adopting micro level supply augmentation options. Finally, for the convenience of interpreting the price coefficient as price elasticity, both the demand and consumption response functions are estimated using the log-log functional form.
PRICING BEHAVIOR AND WATER DEMAND: REGRESSION RESULTS
The data for the empirical estimation of the specified water demand and consumption response models comes from a household survey commissioned by the HMWSSB during 1991-92. While the survey provides information on household-specific water use based on actual meter reading, the household size, and the housing category, it does not provide the crucial information on actual water payment by each household.
However, based on metered water consumption and the water rate structure given in Table   1 , the applicable water bills under both the average and marginal pricing schemes were derived. Table 4 depicts the context-specific coefficients of the demand functions estimated under average pricing behaviour and log-log functional form. Although the R 2 is low in most cases--a common feature in cross-section regression, the relative magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of the coefficients do allow us to evaluate the nature and pattern of water demand across consumption and housing categories. In the all-household context, all the three variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign except the price variable. The counter-intuitive positive price coefficient is a product of the behavioral impact of both the average price perception and perverse nature of current pricing structure.
Water Demand Under Average Pricing Behavior
With average pricing behavior, users maximize their consumer surplus by extending their consumption up to the quantity corresponding to the average price which also declines with each increase in consumption. 13 This behavior causes the price coefficient to be positive.
Since this behavior is liable to be influenced by factors like consumption level and 13 But, in practice, users cannot increase consumption indefinitely as they are constrained either by their maximum water needs or actual water accessibility as fixed by in-house storage and metro supply hours. demand. In terms of the absolute size of the coefficients associated with the three variables, it seems that in the context of the overall sample, the demand is influenced more strongly by family size and house type than by price. What this means is that the demand is affected more by water requirement than by price considerations.
Turning to disaggregated estimates, among groups consuming less than 15 cum, the price coefficient becomes negative with a significant unitary elasticity. This is due to the fact that with a fixed fee for consumption up to 15 cum, the average price declines with increasing consumption. Although the remaining two variables have the unexpected signs, they are insignificant as households in the lowest consumption slab usually have smaller and more uniform family size and fall mostly in housing categories 3 and 4--both with low mean consumption. But, among groups consuming over 15 cum, the price coefficient turns positive and its magnitude becomes far higher than that obtained for the overall sample. The perverse demand functions with an increasing slope especially among larger consumers means that the existing price structure encourages water overuse rather than water conservation. However, unlike the overall demand estimates, the consumption-wise disaggregated estimates show that the price variable plays a stronger role than other variables. The disaggregated demand estimates across housing categories reveal that the price coefficients which is positive and significant for the first two house types with better economic status turns negative for others. Thus, price has a dominant positive effect on water consumption among economically well-to-do groups whereas water requirement has that effect on water demand among others.
Water Demand Under Marginal Pricing Behavior
Since the estimates in Table 5 are based on marginal prices derived from the existing water rate structure, they capture the effects of only a change in price level due to a change in price perception but not the change in the water rate structure. Nevertheless, the incentive gains of even a price switch could still be substantial as shown in Table 5 .
Effecting a switch from the average to marginal pricing behavior--even within the existing water rate structure--leads to a radical change in water consumption behavior. Irrespective of the estimation context, the price coefficient that remained mostly positive under average pricing has now become negative and significant. The coefficients associated with the difference variable are also negative and significant because users have to pay the marginal price even for all intra-marginal units and hence, they have to pay more than what they would have paid otherwise under average pricing. This extra bill, being a negative quantity, has an effect similar to a tax on water use.
14 As expected, the coefficients of both the price and difference variables, though remain negative and significant, differ considerably in terms of their magnitude by context suggesting group-specific variation in price responsiveness. Since the absolute value of the price coefficient is less than one in all contexts except when consumption exceeds 15 cum, the demand is mostly inelastic suggesting that the scope for water conservation under marginal pricing is confined mostly to users in larger consumption brackets. Across housing categories, as we exclude the category 1 (i.e., bungalows with garden), the elasticity of demand varies inversely with H. This suggests that with marginal pricing, richer households (except those in house category 1) could be induced to reduce their metro water consumption and compensate such a reduction by relying on local level supply augmentation options. Notably, households in house category 1 have a more inelastic demand even as compared to the those with their house in slum areas because of the fact that 14 Notice that the consumption reduction implied here pertains only to a reduction in metro water but not in actual water consumption. For, if the value of the difference variable is high enough, users can substitute metro water with other cheaper non-metro water. Thus, the difference variable captures not only the income effects but also the substitution effects of a price switch.
under the existing slab and slab-specific rate structures, the marginal price at higher consumption levels remain invariant over a large range (see Table 1 ). This insensitivity of their consumption even under marginal pricing suggests the nature of the rate structure to be more important than the pricing behavior.
Since the difference variable is capturing the scope for substitution possibilities at the household level, its relatively stronger effect among larger users and economically wellto-do households augers well for economically activating many viable household level supply augmentation options. But, the inelastic nature of demand especially among households with the economic capacity for investing in alternative micro level supply augmentation options dampens the prospects of their actual adoption. This is especially so when the increased price following the price switch is lower than the unit costs of these alternative options. 15 The actual scope for the adoption of supply augmentation options depends not only on price switch but also on factors like the ability to adjust consumption within the supply limits as well as the level or magnitude of price change induced by the price switch. When the water rate structure is such that there is only a marginal difference between the marginal and average prices or when the marginal price remain invariant over a larger range of consumption, the price switch, though provides some incentives for water conservation, may not be strong enough to provide the economic justification for the adoption of direct supply augmentation options.
Price Switch and Consumption Response
The empirical estimates of the consumption response function (equation [4] ) are reported in Table 6 . Since the response function is estimated with a log-log functional form, the estimated coefficients are actually the elasticities indicating how sensitive is consumption change to factors like price change, family size, and housing type. The results
show that all the variables have the expected signs in all cases except the lowest consumption bracket. The response function is quite inelastic to price change in all contexts (except the case where consumption exceeds 15 cum) in the sense that to achieve a given reduction or increment in metro water consumption, one requires a more than proportionate change in price. Among the two consumption brackets, in the first case, the coefficient is positive because P m < P a and hence, consumption change is positive with the price switch.
In the second case, since the coefficient is negative and less than one, a given reduction in consumption can be effected with a less than proportionate increase in the price level. This means that consumption change is quite sensitive to price change. Across house types, the coefficient of the price change variable is negative suggesting that consumption change following the price switch is negative. Notably, since the absolute magnitude of the coefficients increases with the variable H, the level of price change required to effect of a given reduction in consumption declines with the economic/income status of the household. The implication is that economically better endowed households are relatively more price sensitive than others. But, it is not clear from the estimation results whether the price increase and reduction in consumption due to the switch will be strong enough to provide the required level of incentive for the adoption of supply augmentation options even among larger consumers. This uncertainty is partly due to the marginal difference between the average and marginal prices and partly due to the relatively larger scope for adjusting reduced consumption with simple wastage reduction and use efficiency improvement. It is, however, clear from the analysis of both the demand and response functions that the price switch or change in perception is only necessary but not sufficient to provide incentive for the large scale adoption of supply augmentation and conservation options. The sufficient condition can be ensured only when the price switch is effected within a properly designed water rate structure.
ECONOMIC SCOPE FOR S UPPLY AUGMENTATION OPTIONS
To consider still more explicitly the economic scope for the adoption of supply augmentation options, let us evaluate the NWTP calculated for different contexts under both the marginal and average pricing behaviors (see Table 7 ). Since NWTP is sensitive to change in consumption, it has been calculated assuming various levels of reduction in consumption. The NWTP reported in Table 7 reveals important patterns which are largely in line with the analysis of the demand and response functions. To begin with, the higher the value of NWTP in all contexts and pricing behavior. Both in the all-household context as well as among larger water users, the NWTP under the average price is higher than that under marginal price whereas it is the reverse for others. This dualistic pattern is the outcome of the interactive effects of two factors, i.e., the magnitude of difference between average and marginal prices and the difference between the price flexibility of demand (as shown by the inverse of the absolute value of price elasticity) under the two prices. Given the pricing system and quantity change, the NWTP of small and economically poor consumers is generally higher than that for other types of consumers.
This means that the value of water is higher for smaller users with inelastic demand than others with a relatively more elastic demand. It means further that the economic scope for the adoption of supply augmentation options is more among smaller users than among others. This is in contrast to our expectation because it is the larger and more prosperous groups which actually have all the wherewithal for investing in such supply augmentation options. Still then, the lower value of NWTP under the marginal pricing wherever it occurs does show that the marginal pricing scheme exploits consumers surplus better than the average pricing scheme. This obviously augers well both for revenue augmentation and incentive enhancement.
Since NWTP measures the value of raw water under the existing water rate structure, its value with a range of Rs. 0.01 to 2.22/cum does not seem to economically justify the inter-basin water transfers requiring an average cost (at source) of Rs. 2.29 to 4.40/cum. This is also the case for privately organized irrigation water transfers either from the ground water or canal areas. This means that for ensuring economic justification for supply augmentation options involving inter-sectoral water transfers, the water rate structure has to be revised along with the promotion of marginal pricing behavior among consumers.
Since the unit cost of joint groundwater use from wells is only Rs. 0.55/cum (option 1 in Table 2 ), there is substantial incentive for joint initiatives in local supply augmentation including inter-household water sharing even under the existing water rate structure. There is also the scope for the formation of urban water grids and the evolution of local level water organizations. These institutional initiatives, though require a suitable economic environment, cannot materialize on a required scale without proper supportive policies from the urban water supply authorities. More often than not, most of the local level supply augmentation options--including the most costly one involving water purchase from private tankers (option 11 in Table 2 )--which are currently being adopted by some users, happen more because of water non-availability or water inadequacy than because of the economic incentives generated by the existing pricing structure. In contrast to the long-distance water transfer schemes, since most of the local level supply augmentation options involve no or least conveyance and distribution costs, it is the WTP rather the NWTP that is of relevance for evaluating their feasibility.
The relative incentive effects of the pricing schemes on the exploration of and reliance on various technically feasible alternative supply augmentation options can be understood by comparing the cost of these options (Table 2) with the mean water rates under different pricing schemes (Table 3) . Although there is incentive for some supply augmentation options even under the average pricing scheme (e.g., reliance on own wells and ground water diversion from irrigation especially by households living under flats system).
But, both the number of feasible supply augmentation options as well as the level of incentive for their adoption increase under the marginal pricing scheme especially for larger consumers.
In view of the substantial difference between the unit costs associated with the alternative supply augmentation options and the applicable P m , households with higher water consumption (bungalows--either with or without garden--and flats) will find it economically attractive to rely more on own wells and water diversion from irrigation even under the present water rate structure. Obviously, the marginal pricing scheme effected within a more progressive water rate structure could tremendously enhance the motivation for the adoption of more supply augmentation options across a wider section of urban users.
Given the presence of substantial mutual economic gains, there is also an enhanced scope for the emergence of inter-household and inter-sectoral water market as well as private initiatives in organising such water transfers on a larger scale. Moreover, a water rate structure with higher rates and marginal pricing behavior could not only provide financial support to interbasin water transfers but also lend economic justification for additional investment in system rehabilitation and strengthening. As can be seen from Table 3 , depending upon the consumption and housing categories, P m can yield an additional revenue of Rs. 0.32 to 1.00/cum over and above P a even within the existing water rate structure. As to the relative equity effects of the two pricing schemes, P m is closer to both the ability and willingness to pay of users as compared to P a .
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In view of the fast growing urban water demand, large scale supply augmentation options involving inter-basin/inter-sectoral water transfers--whether market-based or otherwise--are obviously inevitable. To make these transfers economically justified and consistent with the internal conditions of urban water sector, the complete exhaustion of supply augmentation potential evident within the existing supply limits is absolutely necessary. As the supply augmentation potential of local level options are fully exhausted and the supply system becomes more efficient, the bringing of additional supply from inter-basin/inter-sectoral transfers can augment supply without any damage to the incentive environment within the urban water sector. Since the urban water economy will be operating in an economically optimal condition with higher degree of water use efficiency, users will be willing to accept higher rates and the increased revenue from such higher water rates could help finance large scale water transfer schemes. While the reduced need for additional supply prompted by higher urban water use efficiency could minimize inter-sectoral water sharing conflicts, the urban consumers' enhanced willingness to pay higher rates could create the basic condition for resolution of intersectoral water conflicts through an economic compensation of the affected parties.
In order to activate various less costly supply augmentation options, policy changes aimed at improving the overall incentive environment hold the key for solving urban water scarcity problems. In view of the crucial economic linkages that the urban water rate structure has with various micro level supply augmentation options, devising a proper pricing policy is obviously the first critical step for creating the economic condition necessary to promote the widespread adoption of micro level supply augmentation and conservation initiatives. Our analysis of water demand and response functions under alternative pricing schemes clearly shows that from the viewpoint of promoting the adoption of local level supply augmentation options including in-house water use efficiency and conservation on a larger scale, marginal pricing scheme, though necessary, is not sufficient due to the inefficiency of present water rate structure. To ensure the sufficient condition for an efficient marginal pricing, the present rate structure has, therefore, to be reformed to provide for higher slab-specific rates and more steeper slab structure where the interval between subsequent slabs declines.
Although a revision in the rate structure itself could induce marginal pricing behavior to some extent, for more effective results, both policy efforts to intensify water education/extension as well as legal and institutional reforms to set right the urban water sector environment are essential to enhance users' sensitivity to water scarcity and their responsiveness to economic incentives. A properly created economic and institutional environment in the urban water sector could also pave the way for the adoption of unconventional approaches including water pricing based on "willingness-to-pay" principle and inter and intra-sectoral water markets which are absolutely necessary both to ensure efficient use of available supply as well as to augment additional supply at economic prices.
The main message of this paper is that local level supply augmentation options, though cannot, by themselves, solve urban water deficit altogether, their exhaustion is admittedly a necessary condition for market-based inter-sectoral water transfers to be free of any damage to the already fragile incentive environment facing the urban water sector. To ensure this supply-side precondition for water transfers, urban water pricing has to be revised to allow higher water rates and more progressive rate structure. Since this policy prescription is generalizable, it applies as much to Hyderabad as to any other urban center in the world.
